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I.   INTRODUCTION 
 In the Supreme Court’s two wetlands cases in the 2005 Term, a 
question of statutory interpretation divided the Justices sharply, in 
part because so much rides on the particular statutory provision at 
issue. The provision—a cryptic definition within the Clean Water Act 
(CWA)1—has now provided three separate occasions for the Justices 
to confront (1) the Chevron doctrine and the Court’s own ambivalence 
toward it, and (2) the CWA’s enormous project of restoring the 
chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the nation’s waters. In 
this Article, I argue that the way the Court went about resolving its 
differences is, unfortunately, not just instructive to environmental 
lawyers. It is illustrative of the Court’s failed minimalism, disregard 
for its own precedents, and tired use of semantics where truly sub-
stantive problems are confronting our society. 
II.   USING OLD CONCEPTS IN NEW LAWS 
 It is perhaps fitting that all three branches of government have 
embarrassed themselves trying to define a concept central to Ameri-
can environmental law. In 1972, Congress declared in the Federal 
Water Pollution Control Act, known as the Clean Water Act (CWA), 
that it was “the national goal that the discharge of pollutants into 
the navigable waters be eliminated by 1985.”2 That, of course, never 
                                                                                                                     
 * Professor, Western New England College School of Law. J.D., Rutgers University 
School of Law; LL.M., Harvard Law School; J.S.D., Columbia University. The author would 
like to thank Jay Austin, Bill Childs, Mike Dorf, and Lisa Goldman for helpful feedback on 
an earlier draft. 
 1. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (2000). 
 2. Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-500, 86 
Stat. 816, 816 (codified at 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(1) (2000)). It was Congress’s declaration be-
184  FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 34:183 
 
happened—not least because Congress itself never really shared the 
ambition of that goal. The statute’s longer-term objective of “re-
stor[ing] and maintain[ing] the chemical, physical, and biological in-
tegrity of the Nation’s waters”3 became, virtually by default, the most 
definite end to which the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) 
and the Corps of Engineers (Corps) could aim. But they have chosen 
an irregular path to that end, partly because the statute is so equivo-
cal about its purposes and its subject (section 502 (7) of the CWA de-
fines its subject, “navigable waters,” as roughly “waters of the United 
States”4) and partly because the courts have been so equivocal about 
the statute’s meaning under our Constitution and practices of statu-
tory construction.5 Great hopes had formed around Rapanos v. 
United States and Carabell v. U.S. Corps of Engineers, the two wet-
lands cases on certiorari in the 2005 Term. But those hopes were 
dashed in a 4-1-4 split at the Court that today threatens to make re-
storing the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the nation’s 
waters even harder.6 
 When the Supreme Court decided Solid Waste Agency of Northern 
Cook County v. U.S. Corps of Engineers (SWANCC),7 environmental 
lawyers were sure the Court would have to return to the scene to 
clarify what it had done.8 In SWANCC, the Court rejected the Corps’ 
interpretation of section 502(7)9 extending it to certain “nonnaviga-
                                                                                                                     
cause Nixon vetoed Pub. L. No. 92-500, but was immediately overridden. See 86 Stat. at 
903-04. 
 3. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (2000). 
 4. Id. § 1362(7). The term “waters of the United States” is defined by both the Army 
Corps of Engineers at 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(a) (2006) and by the EPA at 40 C.F.R. § 230.3(s) 
(2006). Because of its other, related statutes, the Corps also maintains a regulatory defini-
tion of “navigable waters of the United States.” See 33 C.F.R. § 329.4 (2006). These two 
agencies have built a relationship based upon mutual distrust, a function of their having 
been granted a divided authority to implement the Act and of their different institutional 
cultures. See Mark A. Chertok & Kate Sinding, Federal Jurisdiction over Wetlands: “Wa-
ters of the United States,” in WETLANDS LAW AND POLICY: UNDERSTANDING SECTION 404, 
59, 60-61 (Kim Diana Connolly et al. eds., 2005). Currently, the definitions parallel each 
other in substance, although the two agencies’ interpretations and administration of the 
term have been somewhat uneven over the years. See id. at 86-92. 
 5. This Article leaves aside the Corps’ own significant institutional ambivalence to-
ward section 101(a) of the CWA. The history has yet to be written fully detailing the many 
ways in which the Corps itself is responsible for compromising the chemical, physical, and 
biological integrity of the nation’s waters. See MICHAEL GRUNWALD, THE SWAMP: THE 
EVERGLADES, FLORIDA, AND THE POLITICS OF PARADISE (2006); ARTHUR E. MORGAN, DAMS 
AND OTHER DISASTERS: A CENTURY OF THE ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS IN CIVIL WORKS 
(1971). 
 6. See Rapanos v. United States, 126 S. Ct. 2208 (2006). 
 7. 531 U.S. 159 (2001). 
 8. See, e.g., Bradford C. Mank, The Murky Future of the Clean Water Act After 
SWANCC: Using a Hydrological Connection Approach to Saving the Clean Water Act, 30 
ECOLOGY L.Q. 811 (2003). 
 9. The Corps interpreted sections 404 and 502(7) of the CWA (respectively codified at 
33 U.S.C. §§ 1344 and 1362(7)) as including “waters” having principally biological—as op-
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ble, isolated, intrastate waters.”10 The Court held the waters were 
beyond the reach of the CWA as legislated in 1972 and as amended 
in 1977 and again in 1987.11  In reversing the Corps so bluntly, the 
SWANCC majority advanced a view of regulatory federalism dis-
tinctly contrary to the one the agency had practiced. Indeed, the ma-
jority seemed to take jurisdictional geography far more seriously 
than had the Executive—going so far as to reject a call for deference 
that it might ordinarily have answered.12 By doing so, the Court also 
showcased a view of its own authority that is at least in tension with, 
if not flatly contrary to, several of its precedents—indeed with much 
of the last half century of administrative law. This is what made 
SWANCC so extraordinary a presence in environmental law for the 
last five years—and what set the stage for the cases this Term.13 
 The SWANCC opinion left its legal geography mostly uncharted, 
though, especially with respect to wetlands as “waters of the United 
States.”14 Some wetlands are far removed—even completely detached 
                                                                                                                     
posed to hydrological—connections to traditional navigable-in-fact waters. See Mank, su-
pra note 8, at 842-43.  
 10. SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 165-66, 174. 
 11. See id. The Federal Water Pollution Control Act (FWCPA) took its modern, recog-
nizable form through the Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972 (Clean 
Water Act), Pub. L. No. 92-500, 86 Stat. 816 (1972) (codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. §§ 
1251-1387 (2000)). It was the 1977 amendments that changed the statute’s official name to 
the “Clean Water Act,” Clean Water Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-217, § 2, 91 Stat. 1566, 
1566, although it is still denominated FWPCA in the U.S. Code. The Water Quality Act of 
1987, Pub. L. No. 100-4, 101 Stat. 7 (1987), was enacted less than a year after EPA and the 
Corps issued the definition of “waters of the United States” challenged in SWANCC, doing 
nothing to alter those definitions. See Final Rule for Regulatory Programs of the Corps of 
Engineers, 51 Fed. Reg. 41,206 (1986) (codified at 33 C.F.R. §§ 320-30 (2006)).  
 12. See SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 172-74. The Court refused to afford the agencies the 
level of deference identified with Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Coun-
cil, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 172-74. It held instead that an implied 
exception to the Chevron doctrine exists where an agency interpretation of an ambiguous 
statute has the potential to raise “ ‘serious constitutional problems.’ ” Id. at 172-73 (quot-
ing Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Fla. Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 485 U.S. 
568, 575 (1988)). 
 13. As Professor Lazarus argued,  
[t]he SWANCC Court’s conclusion that the plain meaning of “navigable waters” 
cannot extend to isolated, nonnavigable, intrastate waters not physically adja-
cent to waters satisfying what the Court described as the “classical under-
standing of that term” is not, standing alone, remarkable. To anyone approach-
ing the question as a matter of first impression, the ruling might well seem 
logical, if not compelling. What made the Court’s ruling so unsettling to envi-
ronmental law was that the legal issue before the Court was not a matter of 
first impression: the relevant federal agencies (and arguably Congress as well) 
had embraced a view broader than that “classical understanding” for more 
than twenty-five years. 
RICHARD J. LAZARUS, THE MAKING OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 204 (2004). 
 14. The majority in SWANCC held that for such “isolated” waters to be deemed “wa-
ters of the United States,” they had to bear some sort of “significant nexus” to navigable 
waters traditionally defined. See SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 167, 170. 
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at long intervals15—from the “navigable waters” into which they 
eventually and/or occasionally flow.16 The SWANCC opinion said 
nothing about delineating federal as opposed to state jurisdiction 
there.17 Not that this was especially novel: various navigation acts 
have referenced “navigable waters” and their “tributaries” going back 
decades, implying the existence of a set the courts have long strug-
gled to identify.18  
 But the SWANCC case emphasized the point of the CWA—the 
restoration of the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the 
nation’s waters—intersecting most directly with the Court’s recent 
federalism precedents. Hydrographic modifications are so common 
today and the building of infrastructure that is impervious to precipi-
tation is so widespread that wetlands protection and runoff regula-
tion have become hot button social issues.19 Yet the natural capital 
that functioning wetlands represent makes the test for Commerce 
Clause authority articulated in United States v. Lopez20 and else-
where21 no test at all. Destroying this resource is easily among 
                                                                                                                     
 15. Dennis W. Magee, A Primer on Wetlands Ecology, in WETLANDS LAW AND POLICY: 
UNDERSTANDING SECTION 404 27, 28-32 (Kim Diana Connolly et al. eds., 2005).  
 16. See, e.g., United States v. Gerke Excavating, Inc., 412 F.3d 804, 805 (7th Cir. 
2005) (describing a long, attenuated path connecting the wetlands at issue to waters that 
were navigable in fact), cert. granted and vacated, 126 S. Ct. 2964 (2006), remanded to 464 
F.3d 723 (7th Cir. 2006). “Wetlands” have long been defined by the agencies as lands “that 
are inundated or saturated by surface or ground water at a frequency and duration suffi-
cient to support, and that under normal circumstances do support, a prevalence of vegeta-
tion typically adapted for life in saturated soil conditions.” 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(b) (2005). But 
this definition encompasses swamp and cornfield alike. See United States v. Rapanos, 376 
F.3d 629, 642-43 (6th Cir. 2004). 
 17. Thus, unlike Rapanos and Carabell, no “adjacency” issue was present in 
SWANCC. Estimates vary, but with roughly 278 million acres of wetlands across the coun-
try, William L. Andreen, Water Quality Today—Has the Clean Water Act Been a Success?, 
55 ALA. L. REV. 537, 553 (2004), this was easily the most politically charged issue in 
SWANCC. Together with the concept of a tributary, it then became the parade of horribles 
in Justice Scalia’s opinion in Rapanos. See Rapanos v. United States, 126 S. Ct. 2208, 
2214-19 (2006). 
 18. See, e.g., Leovy v. United States, 177 U.S. 621, 633 (1900) (arguing that tributar-
ies of “navigable in fact” waters cannot be “navigable waters of the United States” because 
if they were “there is scarcely a creek or stream in the entire country which is not a navi-
gable water of the United States”). 
 19. See Robert W. Adler, The Two Lost Books in the Water Quality Trilogy: The Elu-
sive Objectives of Physical and Biological Integrity, 33 ENVTL. L. 29, 30-35 (2003). 
 20. 514 U.S. 549 (1995).  
 21. The Court has decided at least three significant challenges to federal statutes un-
der the Commerce Clause since Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146 (1971). Perez upheld 
Title II of the Consumer Credit Protection Act prohibiting “loansharking” as part of a lar-
ger program attacking organized crime and was the first opinion to set out the familiar 
three-part test Lopez made so famous. Deborah Jones Merritt, Commerce!, 94 MICH. L. 
REV. 674, 702-03 & n.118 (1995). The three cases are Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995); United 
States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000); and Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005). These 
cases were part of a larger renaissance of states’ rights decisions under Chief Justice 
Rehnquist. See Peter J. Smith, Sources of Federalism: An Empirical Analysis of the Court’s 
Quest for Original Meaning, 52 UCLA L. REV. 217, 221-23 (2004). 
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that “ ‘class of activities’ that have a substantial effect on interstate 
commerce.”22 Even “isolated” wetlands and their destruction most 
certainly do “substantially affect” interstate commerce.23 So the ques-
tion in Rapanos and Carabell was not whether Congress could au-
thorize its agencies to regulate remote wetlands and tributaries; the 
question was always whether it did do so in the CWA. It was solely a 
question of statutory meaning. 
 It was a question more interesting and complex than any equiva-
lent constitutional question, though, because it straddled the deepest 
structural fissures running through most of our federal environ-
mental and natural resource laws. The first law of ecology teaches 
that no part of nature is really separate from another. Tributaries, 
headwaters, and wetlands, known to conservation scientists as the 
places “where rivers are born,”24 are integral to accomplishing the 
CWA’s restorative objective.25 But their range across North America26 
                                                                                                                     
 22.  Raich, 545 U.S. at 17; cf. id. (“When Congress decides that the ‘total incidence’ of 
a practice poses a threat to a national market, it may regulate the entire class.”) (citation 
omitted). In Lopez, the Court held that where the legislation regulates neither overtly 
commercial activity nor the “channels” or “instrumentalities” of interstate commerce, it 
may still regulate activities that “substantially affect” interstate commerce and be a consti-
tutional use of Article I authority. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558-59. Some courts have expressly 
analyzed the Commerce Clause issues raised by section 502(7) in terms of the protection of 
the “channels” of interstate commerce. See, e.g., United States v. Deaton, 332 F.3d 698 (4th 
Cir. 2003); United States v. Buday, 138 F. Supp. 2d 1282 (D. Mont. 2001). Moreover, the 
Court has long maintained that 
[a] complex regulatory program . . . can survive a Commerce Clause challenge 
without a showing that every single facet of the program is independently and 
dirxectly related to a valid congressional goal. It is enough that the challenged 
provisions are an integral part of the regulatory program and that the regula-
tory scheme when considered as a whole satisfies this test. 
Hodel v. Indiana, 452 U.S. 314, 329 n.17 (1981). 
 23. See, e.g., Elaine Bueschen, Do Isolated Wetlands Substantially Affect Interstate 
Commerce?, 46 AM. U. L. REV. 931, 954-60 (1997). 
 24. JUDY L. MEYER ET AL., WHERE RIVERS ARE BORN: THE SCIENTIFIC IMPERATIVE FOR 
DEFENDING SMALL STREAMS AND WETLANDS 5 (2003), available at 
http://www.americanrivers.org/site/pageserver?pagename=AMR_publications#clean (follow 
“Where Rivers Are Born: The Scientific Imperative for Defending Small Streams and Wet-
lands” hyperlink).  
 25. Magee, supra note 15, at 37-43. The Executive Branch has long maintained that 
the CWA’s most basic objective is the restoration of the chemical, physical, and biological 
integrity of the nation’s waters. See Administrative Authority to Construe § 404 of the 
Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 43 Op. Att’y Gen. 197, 197 (1979) (interpreting 33 
U.S.C. §§ 1251, 1311, 1344 as having a “basic objective” of restoring and maintaining the 
“chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the Nation’s waters”). Justice Scalia twice 
emphasized the statement in section 101(b) of the CWA that “ ‘[i]t is the policy of Congress 
to recognize, preserve, and protect the primary responsibilities and rights of States to pre-
vent, reduce and eliminate pollution.’ ” Rapanos v. United States, 126 S. Ct. 2208, 2215, 
2223 (2006). No statute can intelligibly have as its goal some end that would be better 
served by its nonexistence, though. Section 101(b) of the CWA is rather a proviso to the 
Executive in how it goes about implementing the CWA. See infra notes 109-14 and accom-
panying text. 
 26. See supra note 19. 
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casts that objective into a federal mission of sweeping proportions 
(almost as sweeping, in fact, as was the federal effort to fill and “re-
claim” “swamps” prior to the 1970s).27 Such a mandate could, on the 
courts’ understanding of the problem, swallow that most local of pre-
rogatives, the “primary power over land . . . use.”28 Whatever its par-
ticular priorities, though, Congress has never asserted exclusive fed-
eral authority over natural resources29—direct testimony to the po-
litical safeguards of “our federalism.”30 The question presented to the 
Court in Rapanos and Carabell was therefore two-fold: how geo-
graphically extensive is the CWA’s reach and who has the legal au-
thority to say?  
III.   “WATERS” AND “NAVIGABLE WATERS” 
 Like most federal environmental statutes, the CWA has been pro-
foundly influenced by legal cases testing the scope of the govern-
ment’s prescriptive authority.31 Indeed, just like the Endangered 
Species Act,32 the CWA employs a critical, jurisdiction-defining term 
with an extraordinarily muddled legal pedigree.33 It has, one might 
even say, invited such challenges from anyone with enough to lose to 
motivate them into court. In 1972, Congress amended the Federal 
Water Pollution Control Act, a statute it had first legislated in 1948, 
to make it into a more comprehensive, prescriptive, “federalizing” 
                                                                                                                     
 27. See Jonathan H. Adler, Wetlands, Waterfowl, and the Menace of Mr. Wilson: 
Commerce Clause Jurisprudence and the Limits of Federal Wetland Regulation, 29 ENVTL. 
L. 1, 19-27 (1999). 
 28. SWANCC, 521 U.S. 159, 174 (2001) (“ ‘[R]egulation of land use [is] a function tra-
ditionally performed by local governments.’ ”) (quoting Hess v. Port Auth. Trans-Hudson 
Corp., 513 U.S. 30, 44 (1994)). 
 29. See Robert L. Fischman, Cooperative Federalism and Natural Resources Law, 14 
N.Y.U. ENVTL. L. J. 179, 183-84 (2005). 
 30. See Herbert Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the 
States in the Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 
543 (1954). 
 31. On the central role litigation has played in shaping the CWA’s reach and sub-
stance, see ROBERT W. ADLER ET AL., THE CLEAN WATER ACT: 20 YEARS LATER (1993). 
 32. Endangered Species Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-205, 87 Stat. 84 (1973) (codified as 
amended in 7 U.S.C. § 136 and scattered sections of 16 U.S.C.). 
 33. As the Court noted in Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a 
Greater Oregon, 515 U.S. 687 (1995), the Endangered Species Act’s defined term “take” has 
a long history of various definitions in the law, each with its own purposes. The statute’s 
definition of “take” includes actions that “harass, harm, pursue, hunt, shoot, wound, kill, 
trap, capture, or collect, or to attempt to engage in any such conduct.” 16 U.S.C. § 1532(19) 
(2000). The agencies’ regulatory definitions of the statute’s definitional terms “harm” and 
“harass” include habitat modifications but were, themselves, at issue in Babbitt and like 
cases. Many of those cases have come down to evidentiary doubts that some particular ac-
tion does in fact “harm” or “harass” the listed species. See, e.g., Marbled Murrelet v. Bab-
bitt, 83 F.3d 1060 (9th Cir. 1996); Forest Conservation Council v. Rosboro Lumber Co., 50 
F.3d 781 (9th Cir. 1995); Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n v. Burlington N. R.R., 23 F.3d 1508 (9th Cir. 
1994). 
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statute.34 Cryptically, it took a program that had previously and 
variously denoted its subject as “interstate waters,”35 “interstate or 
navigable waters,”36 and “navigable waters of the United States,”37 
and, in section 502(7), redefined its subject as “waters of the United 
States, including the territorial seas.”38 For over thirty years now this 
demarcation of federal authority has taxed the legal system’s collec-
tive wits39 for the simple reason that the dignity afforded states in 
“our federalism” colors statutes like the CWA exceptional, subjecting 
                                                                                                                     
 34. Readers needing a history of the legislative evolution from 1948-1972 can do no 
better than William L. Andreen, The Evolution of Water Pollution Control in the United 
States—State, Local, and Federal Efforts, 1789-1972: Part II, 22 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 215 
(2003). 
 35. The very first iteration of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act (FWPCA) in 
1948 referenced “interstate waters” and defined them as “all rivers, lakes, and other wa-
ters that flow across, or form a part of, State boundaries.” Pub. L. No. 80-845 § 10(e), 62 
Stat. 1155, 1161 (1948). This extension of federal prescriptive authority was certainly nar-
rower than the Congress’s Article I authority as then interpreted by the courts. See, e.g., 
United States v. Rock Royal Coop., Inc., 307 U.S. 533, 569 (1939) (“Activities conducted 
within state lines do not by this fact alone escape the sweep of the Commerce Clause. In-
terstate commerce may be dependent upon them.”). 
 36. The 1961 amendments provided a dilute remedy against the 
pollution of interstate or navigable waters in or adjacent to any State or States 
(whether the matter causing or contributing to such pollution is discharged di-
rectly into such waters or reaches such waters after discharge into a tributary 
of such waters), which endangers the health or welfare of any persons. 
Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1961, Pub. L. No. 87-88, § 7, 75 Stat. 
204, 208 (1961). The amendments did not define “tributary” or “navigable waters,” al-
though they presumably did adopt the definition of “interstate waters” already a part of 
the FWPCA. 
 37. The 1966 FWPCA amendments defined “navigable waters of the United States,” 
“[w]hen used in this Act, unless the context otherwise requires,” to mean “all portions of 
the sea within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States, and all inland waters navi-
gable in fact.” Clean Water Restoration Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-753, § 211, 80 Stat. 
1246, 1252-53 (1966). It was this set of waters in the FWPCA that was referenced by the 
Court in Illinois v. City of Milwaukee (Illinois v. Milwaukee I), 406 U.S. 91 (1972), the 
Court’s famous interstate common law nuisance case over the sewage discharges to Lake 
Michigan. See id. at 102 (“[T]he [FWPCA] makes clear that it is federal, not state, law that 
in the end controls the pollution of interstate or navigable waters.”).  
 38. Pub. L. No. 92-500, § 502(7), 86 Stat. 816, 885. The term “territorial seas” was it-
self defined to mean “the belt of the seas measured from the line of ordinary low water 
along that portion of the coast which is in direct contact with the open sea and the line 
marking the seaward limit of inland waters, and extending seaward a distance of three 
miles.” Id. at § 502(8). In more than thirty years, Congress has never seen fit to clarify the 
definition of “navigable waters” and, in fact, has actually incorporated it into other stat-
utes. See Rice v. Harken Exploration Co., 250 F.3d 264, 267-68 (5th Cir. 2001) (finding that 
section 1001(21) of the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 was an intentional congressional adoption 
of section 502(7) of the CWA, including conflicting judicial interpretations). As Professor 
Mank has argued, it is still unlikely a congressional majority will materialize to change the 
statute’s definition. See Bradford R. Mank, Implementing Rapanos—Will Justice Kennedy’s 
Significant Nexus Test Provide a Workable Standard for Lower Courts, Regulators, and 
Developers?, 40 IND. L. REV. 291, 346-47 (2007). 
 39. See Marjorie A. Shields, Annotation, What Are “Navigable Waters” Subject to Fed-
eral Water Pollution Control Act (33 U.S.C.A. §§ 1251 et seq.)?, 160 A.L.R. FED. 585 (Supp. 
2005) (gathering cases with contrasting holdings on the extension of CWA jurisdiction). 
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them to constant judicial scrutiny.40 The CWA, after all, famously 
announces that “it is the policy of the Congress to recognize, pre-
serve, and protect the primary responsibilities and rights of States to 
prevent, reduce, and eliminate pollution.”41 Thus, the semantics of 
section 502(7), and therefore the scope of the entire statute, seem to 
invite interpretation and perhaps even misinterpretation. It is, after 
all, not self-evident what real work is done by the definition of an ex-
pression that is just the expression itself minus a word. The Court 
has found this invitation irresistible three times now, but its work 
product has been less and less about grammar each time.  
 Article I authority to regulate waters that could be made naviga-
ble with improvements was established law well before the CWA.42 
And as to regulated activities, federal authority had extended beyond 
just the licensing of vessel traffic43 to the building of wharves, piers, 
and other infrastructure;44 dredging and manipulating channels;45 
and even to the complete destruction of the water’s navigability.46 But 
the legal concept of “navigable waters” runs even deeper than just ju-
                                                                                                                     
 40. See, e.g., Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 457 (1991) (“As every schoolchild 
learns, our Constitution establishes a system of dual sovereignty between the States and the 
Federal Government.”); Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44 (1971) (“ ‘Our Federalism’ . . . does 
not mean blind deference to ‘States Rights’ any more than it means centralization of con-
trol over every important issue in our National Government and its courts. The Framers 
rejected both these courses.”). 
 41. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(b) (2000). This “policy” traces, in slightly different language, to 
the 1956 version of the Water Pollution Control Act, Pub. L. No. 84-660, § 1(a), 70 Stat. 
498, 498. 
 42. See, e.g., United States v. Utah, 283 U.S. 64, 83 (1931). Congress’s Commerce 
Clause authority has, at least since Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824), been 
split in concept between a broader power to regulate most things commercial and its more 
specialized complement, a “Navigation Power,” where the latter is available only on waters 
that are, were, or could be “navigable in fact.”  See, e.g., The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 
557, 565 (1870). Of course, “navigable in fact” is itself a famous neologism. See Richard J. 
Pierce, Jr., What Is a Navigable Water?: Canoes Count but Kayaks Do Not, 53 SYRACUSE L. 
REV. 1067 (2003) (tracing the development of navigability-in-fact doctrine and arguing that 
it has grown so malleable as to be incoherent). 
 43. See Gibbons, 22 U.S. at 193-221. Initially, this, too, was as much a question of 
meaning as of federalism. Cf. id. at 193 (“The word used in the [C]onstitution, then, com-
prehends, and has been always understood to comprehend, navigation within its meaning; 
and a power to regulate navigation, is as expressly granted, as if that term had been added 
to the word ‘commerce.’ ”). 
 44. See United States v. Republic Steel Corp., 362 U.S. 482 (1960) (interpreting Riv-
ers and Harbors Act of 1899 broadly to vest in Corps great discretion over the building of 
navigation infrastructure).  
 45. See United States v. Texas, 339 U.S. 707, 717 (1950); United States v. Oregon, 295 
U.S. 1 (1935). 
 46. By design, a dam may enable navigation between points A and B while precluding 
it between AB and C. See, e.g., Ashwander v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 326-30 
(1936); cf. United States v. Rands, 389 U.S. 121, 122-23 (1967) (“The Commerce Clause 
confers a unique position upon the Government in connection with navigable waters. ‘The 
power to regulate commerce comprehends the control for that purpose, and to the extent 
necessary, of all the navigable waters of the United States.’ ”) (quoting Gilman v. City of 
Philadelphia, 70 U.S. 713, 724-25 (1865)). 
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risdiction to prescribe. In fact, the phrase is perhaps a uniquely rich 
artifact for historians of our federalism, also serving as a predicate 
for federal court admiralty jurisdiction47 and as the (evolving) demar-
cation between federal and state public trust land and “servitude” 
ownership.48 Against this backdrop, section 502(7) seems like an art-
less congressional dodge—especially given what is at stake in most of 
the CWA’s domain. 
 In the five years following SWANCC, the circuits had split over 
the geographic scope of section 502(7),49 the Executive had proposed 
to amend its definition to curb section 502(7)’s scope and then 
changed its mind,50 and property rights advocates had become con-
vinced that the Executive agencies had run amok.51 Congress hardly 
even considered acting. And instead of resolving any of this mess 
with Rapanos and Carabell (as many lawyers had, since SWANCC, 
hoped it would), the Court just continued to hoard all of the statute’s 
biggest questions into its own inscrutable future. 
 Justice Scalia’s “plurality” opinion argues that in order to qualify 
as “waters of the United States,” wetlands must have some perma-
nent surface connection to “relatively permanent, standing or flowing 
bodies of water” that are, if not necessarily “navigable” in any tradi-
tional sense, more than just “transitory puddles or ephemeral flows 
of water.”52 In contrast to this emphasis on “permanence” and prox-
                                                                                                                     
 47. See The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) at 563 (holding that the geographic limits 
of admiralty jurisdiction under Article III are all those waters that are or might be “high-
ways for commerce, over which trade and travel are or may be conducted in the customary 
modes of trade and travel on water”). 
 48. See Lewis Blue Point Oyster Cultivation Co. v. Briggs, 229 U.S. 82 (1913); United 
States v. California, 382 U.S. 448 (1966). 
 49. FD & P Enters. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 239 F. Supp. 2d 509, 513-16 (D.N.J. 
2003). The clear majority of cases to reach the circuit level affirmed the extension of juris-
diction over remote wetlands and headwaters of various types. See, e.g., Save Our Sonoran, 
Inc. v. Flowers, 408 F.3d 1113 (9th Cir. 2005); United States v. Rapanos, 376 F.3d 629 (6th 
Cir. 2004); Treacy v. Newdunn Assoc., 344 F.3d 407 (4th Cir. 2003); United States v. Rueth 
Dev. Co., 335 F.3d 598 (7th Cir. 2003); Headwaters, Inc. v. Talent Irrigation Dist., 243 F.3d 
526 (9th Cir. 2001). For example, where the wetlands at issue were adjacent to and 
drained into “a roadside ditch whose waters eventually flow into the navigable Wicomico 
River and Chesapeake Bay,” the Fourth Circuit held that the extension of CWA jurisdic-
tion was reasonable. See United States v. Deaton, 332 F.3d 698, 702 (4th Cir. 2003). One 
case, however, did reject the extension of CWA jurisdiction to remote wetlands, see In re 
Needham, 354 F.3d 340 (5th Cir. 2003), and another rejected a strictly hydrological con-
nection test where the connection was via ground water, see Rice v. Harken Exploration 
Co., 250 F.3d 264 (5th Cir. 2001), setting up the circuit split the Court addressed in Ra-
panos and Carabell. 
 50. See Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking on the Clean Water Act Regulatory 
Definition of “Waters of the United States,” 68 Fed. Reg. 1991 (proposed Jan. 15, 2003). 
 51. See, e.g., Brief of Amici Curiae Washington Legal Foundation et al. in Support of 
Petitioners, Rapanos v. United States, 126 S. Ct. 2208 (2006) (No. 04-1034). 
 52. Rapanos v. United States, 126 S. Ct. 2208, 2220-21 (2006) (Scalia, J., joined by 
Roberts, C.J., and Thomas, Alito, JJ.). The Scalia opinion is misleadingly denoted as the 
plurality if, by that, it is meant as the authoritative statement of the judgment in the case. 
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imity to navigable-in-fact waters, Justice Kennedy’s “concurrence” 
argued that wetlands “possess the requisite nexus” if they “either 
alone or in combination with similarly situated lands in the region[] 
significantly affect the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of 
other covered waters more readily understood as ‘navigable.’ ”53 What 
is so extraordinary about these opinions, though, is that Justice 
Kennedy’s arguments had more in common with the dissent54 than 
                                                                                                                     
While both the Scalia and Kennedy opinions remand with instructions for further proceed-
ings, the Scalia but not the Kennedy opinion directs that in those proceedings only the 
finding of adjacency of petitioners’ wetlands to “ ‘waters’ in the ordinary sense of contain-
ing a relatively permanent flow” possessing “a continuous surface connection” will support 
federal jurisdiction. Id. at 2235. Kennedy’s opinion leaves other possibilities open for sup-
porting federal jurisdiction on the lands at issue in the two cases. See, e.g., id. at 2242 
(Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment) (expressly rejecting that limitation on federal 
authority over wetlands that otherwise possess a “significant nexus” to traditional “navi-
gable waters”). But Justice Kennedy would also require proof of a “substantial nexus” in 
waters and wetlands to which Justice Scalia’s opinion would extend the Act presumptively. 
See id. at 2248. 
  In guidance issued in June 2007, the Corps and EPA jointly declared that they 
will apply Rapanos to assert jurisdiction if the wetlands or tributaries meet either Justice 
Kennedy’s or Justice Scalia’s standards. See Clean Water Act Jurisdiction Following the 
U.S. Supreme Court’s Decision in Rapanos v. United States & Carabell v. United States 
(June 5, 2007), available at http://www.epa.gov/owow/wetlands/pdf/RapanosGuidance6507.pdf 
(hereinafter Rapanos Guidance). But it is at best unclear how a statutory interpretation 
case where there was no majority ought to append two separate definitions to a statute 
that is administered by an agency. The Court has said that “[w]hen a fragmented Court 
decides a case and no single rationale explaining the result enjoys the assent of five Jus-
tices, ‘the holding of the Court may be viewed as that position taken by those Members 
who concurred in the judgments on the narrowest grounds.’ ” Marks v. United States, 430 
U.S. 188, 193 (1977) (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 169 n.15 (1976) (opinion of 
Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.). And the Rapanos Guidance expressly invokes Marks. 
See Rapanos Guidance, supra, at 3. But even putting aside concerns that Marks is un-
workable in practice, Marks was a constitutional case, not the interpretation of a statute 
administered by an agency. Where the (prospective) meaning of such a statute divides the 
court evenly, it stands to reason—at least as well as Marks’s reasoning—that no authorita-
tive precedent exists because combining disparate rationales to comprise a holding con-
flates the law of a case with the prospective aspect of precedent. Examples of this confusion 
have already arisen. See, e.g., United States v. Cundiff, 480 F. Supp. 2d 940 (W.D. Ky. 
2007) (constructing the “controlling standard” for reading CWA section 502(7) from both 
the Kennedy and Scalia opinions). In United States v. Gerke Excavating, Inc., 412 F.3d 804 
(7th Cir. 2005), a case that was vacated for further proceedings in light of Rapanos, Gerke 
Excavating, Inc. v. United States, 126 S. Ct. 2964, 2964 (2006), the Seventh Circuit in-
voked Marks to interpret Rapanos on remand before the Rapanos Guidance was issued. 
United States v. Gerke Excavating, Inc., 464 F.3d 723, 724 (7th Cir. 2006). But the Sev-
enth Circuit did so to combine Justice Kennedy’s test with that of the dissent as well as 
that of the “plurality” alternatively, essentially triangulating Justice Kennedy’s opinion 
into the opinion of the Court on the meaning of section 502(7). Id. at 724-25. The oddity of 
investing such authority in the opinion of a single Justice has not been lost on all courts. 
See, e.g., United States v. Chevron Pipe Line Co., 437 F. Supp. 2d 605, 613 (N.D. Tex. 
2006) (refusing to find any opinion in Rapanos controlling). 
 53. Rapanos, 126 S. Ct. at 2248 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment). 
 54. The dissent argued that the extension of section 502(7) to intermittent tributaries 
and most wetlands is, regardless of the agency interpretations on point, the best interpre-
tation of the statute. See Rapanos, 126 S. Ct. at 2264-66 (Stevens, J., joined by Souter, 
Ginsburg, and Breyer, JJ., dissenting). As Justice Stevens made clear, this is the essence 
of Parts I and II of Justice Kennedy’s opinion. See id. at 2264. 
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with the so-called plurality, and the five Justices in the plurality 
agreed on virtually no rationale for the result. 
IV.   MEANING AND REFERENCE: THE TRUTH ABOUT “WATERS OF THE 
UNITED STATES” 
 United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc.55 and SWANCC 
were both, in a sense, predictable. The CWA’s cryptic text was un-
doubtedly a congressional punt,56 although it remains unclear at 
whom it was aimed: a judiciary increasingly mindful of state dignity 
or the administrative agencies?57 It makes a fair amount of sense, 
though, that wetlands adjacent to navigable-in-fact waters would be 
covered and some waters inherently local in scale would not. After 
all, if section 502(7) meant the agencies were empowered to regulate 
the wholly intrastate, isolated, man-made ponds that were at issue in 
northern Cook County,58 where would Executive power end? Having 
recourse to some general theory in answering such basic questions 
would surely be useful. Unfortunately, there seems to be no such 
general theory—at least not one that appears very reliable. The 
CWA’s language can be interpreted to produce very disparate results 
just by way of the canons of statutory construction,59 even before aca-
demic jurisprudence and/or theories of language are involved.60 Legal 
theory today is enmeshed in the philosophy of language, much as it 
                                                                                                                     
 55. 474 U.S. 121 (1985). 
 56. See Peter H. Aranson et al., A Theory of Legislative Delegation, 68 CORNELL L. 
REV. 1 (1982). 
 57. Cf. Matthew C. Stephenson, Legislative Allocation of Delegated Power: Uncer-
tainty, Risk, and the Choice Between Agencies and Courts, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1035, 1070 
(2006) (“One of the most basic decisions a legislator must make . . . is whether to delegate 
to an administrative agency or to the courts.”). Stephenson’s model suggests that rational 
legislators should prefer to delegate to agencies, although the CWA is silent as to the scope 
of the agencies’ rulemaking powers and as to the scope of judicial review of agency rule-
makings like the one implementing section 502(7). 
 58. Indeed, in United States v. Wilson, 133 F.3d 251 (4th Cir. 1997), the Fourth Cir-
cuit rejected the regulatory interpretation that would be at issue in SWANCC four years 
later. In dicta, that court even said that 
it is arguable that Congress has the power to regulate the discharge of pollut-
ants into any waters that themselves flow across state lines, or connect to wa-
ters that do so, regardless of whether such waters are navigable in fact, merely 
because of the interstate nature of such waters, although the existence of such 
a far reaching power could be drawn into question by the Court’s recent feder-
alism jurisprudence. 
Id. at 256 (citing Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997); United States v. Lopez, 514 
U.S. 549 (1995); and others); see also Tabb Lakes Ltd. v. United States, 715 F. Supp. 726 
(E.D. Va. 1988), aff’d, 885 F.2d 866 (4th Cir. 1989) (voicing doubts in dicta that the migra-
tory bird nexus was sufficient for Corps jurisdiction). Another decision, Leslie Salt Co. v. 
United States, 55 F.3d 1388 (9th Cir. 1995), cert. denied sub nom., Cargill v. United States, 
116 S. Ct. 407 (1995), upheld the migratory bird “rule,” but by a very narrow margin of 
deference. 
 59. See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION (1994). 
 60. See generally BRIAN BIX, LAW, LANGUAGE, AND LEGAL DETERMINACY (1993). 
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has been for forty years, because its practitioners all acknowledge 
law’s eternal flirtation with indeterminacy.61 Yet contemporary theo-
ries of language bring a measure of clarity to one thing about section 
502(7): how much is open to debate.  
 Now, if there is one category of legal term whose meaning should 
be relatively clear, it is so-called natural kind terms like ‘water’ or 
‘species.’62 Several currents in the philosophy of language over the 
last several decades suggest that using such terms is the equivalent 
of rigidly designating whatever in the world is at the end of the ut-
terance—whatever is its referent—as a matter of causal fact.63  “Wa-
ters” of the United States might just mean whatever in the world an 
expert would find was a water body.64 The problem here is that where 
land stops and water starts is so deeply unclear in so many different 
contexts—as geomorphologists and ecologists have argued with in-
creasing clarity and as the Rapanos Court was painfully aware.65 In 
short, as a physical (and as a spatio-temporal) reference, “waters” is 
actually pretty vague.66 
                                                                                                                     
 61. Once the province of “legal realists,” the theory that legal argument is a cover for 
naked preferences now belongs to social scientists employing the “attitudinal model.” See 
Frank B. Cross, Political Science and the New Legal Realism: A Case of Unfortunate Inter-
disciplinary Ignorance, 92 NW. U. L. REV. 251 (1997). 
 62. See David O. Brink, Legal Theory, Legal Interpretation, and Judicial Review, 17 
PHIL. & PUB. AFFS. 105 (1988) (propounding a realist theory of legal interpretation 
grounded in the semantics of “natural kind” terms). It is not clear that natural kinds help 
legal interpretation very much as a general matter. See DENNIS PATTERSON, LAW AND 
TRUTH 51-53 (1996). I use them here for exemplary purposes only.  
 63. See, e.g., SAUL A. KRIPKE, NAMING AND NECESSITY (1980); Hilary Putnam, The 
Meaning of ‘Meaning,’ in MIND, LANGUAGE AND REALITY: PHILOSOPHICAL PAPERS VOLUME 
2, 215 (1975). 
 64. PUTNAM, supra note 63, at 241 (“[I]f there is a hidden structure, then generally it 
determines what it is to be a member of the natural kind, not only in the actual world, but 
in all possible worlds.”). Given the existence of experts, not all speakers of a concept need 
know its exact extension. Cf. id. at 227 (“[T]here is a division of linguistic labor. We could 
hardly use such words as ‘elm’ and ‘aluminum’ if no one possessed a way of recognizing elm 
trees and aluminum metal; but not everyone to whom the distinction is important has to 
be able to make the distinction.”). That would certainly square with basic principles of ad-
ministrative law. See NLRB v. Hearst Publ’ns, Inc., 322 U.S. 111 (1944) (deferring to 
agency’s interpretation of statutory term “employee,” a term with several meanings at 
common law, by reasoning that Congress intended agency expertise and national uniform-
ity to be the result, not ad hoc judicial discretion). 
 65. See, e.g., RONALD U. COOKE & RICHARD W. REEVES, ARROYOS AND 
ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE IN THE AMERICAN SOUTH-WEST (1976). From arroyos to bayous, 
to beach erosion and accretion, to floodplains, to ground/surface water interchanges, to 
mangroves, to oxbows, to wetlands, the places where the boundary between land and water 
is either constantly in flux or fundamentally vague are too numerous to pretend otherwise. 
Cf. Rapanos v. United States, 126 S. Ct. 2208, 2221 n.5 (2006) (Scalia, J., joined by Rob-
erts, C.J., and Thomas, Alito, J.) (admitting that line-drawing between “waters” and land 
is inherently contingent on the purposes for which the lines are being drawn). 
 66. Cf. T.E. Wilkerson, Species, Essences and the Names of Natural Kinds, 43 PHIL. Q. 
1, 7-10 (1993) (arguing that some natural kinds such as “species” turn out, on reflection, to 
cover over enormous variabilities in nature, thus creating significant ambiguities in reference). 
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 Cases like this have paved the way for another, different theory of 
language that is deeply skeptical of any “fact of the matter” where 
meaning is concerned. This theory would fix the meaning of the con-
cept “waters” by resorting to the conventions of speech observed by 
competent speakers, in essence allowing usage to determine meaning 
instead of reference.67 On this theory, “waters of the United States” 
means just whatever lawyers, judges, and administrators have used 
it to mean. But even now we have no way to settle what the concept 
actually hooks up with: CWA practice itself has established how 
many different credible usages of the concept there are.68 Even 
within the Rapanos plurality there seemed to be significant variation 
in what the Justices thought practice had brought to the term.69 And 
all this is before we bring in the messy social institutions invoked by 
the expression: some theory of our federalism, after all, must settle 
what “of the United States” truly means.70 To parse apart the possi-
ble congressional intentions within that set of issues is to broaden 
the inquiry perhaps indefinitely. 
 Thus, it cannot be doubted that section 502(7) is an exemplar of 
what legal theorists see as law’s areas of “open texture.”71 The gener-
                                                                                                                     
 67. See, e.g., Michael Dummett, Realism, in TRUTH AND OTHER ENIGMAS 145, 146 
(1978). Perhaps the fairest ascription of this “antirealist” view would be, ironically, to cer-
tain American “legal realists” like Llewellyn. See H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 139 
(2d ed. 1994). 
 68. Compare Headwaters, Inc. v. Talent Irrigation Dist., 243 F.3d 526 (9th Cir. 2001) 
(local irrigation district’s canals held to be “waters of the United States”), with United 
States v. City of Fort Pierre, 747 F.2d 464 (8th Cir. 1984) (wetlands created by man-made 
manipulations of adjacent river not “waters of the United States”); compare United States 
v. Wilson, 133 F.3d 251 (4th Cir. 1997) (split panel unable to agree what constitutes “adja-
cency” sufficient to put wetlands within “waters of the United States”), with United States v. 
Pozsgai, 999 F.2d 719 (3d Cir. 1993) (wetlands above headwaters that were adjacent to tribu-
taries susceptible to use in interstate commerce held to be “waters of the United States”). 
 69. Justice Scalia’s opinion argued that it is “beyond parody” that section 502(7) had 
been extended to storm sewers, drainage ditches, and “[dry] arroyos in the middle of the 
desert.” Rapanos, 126 S. Ct. at 2222 (Scalia, J., joined by Roberts, C.J., and Thomas, Alito, 
JJ.). He further noted that “[t]hese judicial constructions . . . are not outliers. Rather, they 
reflect the breadth of the Corps’ determinations in the field.” Id. at 2218. This was in keep-
ing with his conclusion that the only wetlands and tributarties properly subject to federal 
jurisdiction were those “with a continuous surface connection” to “permanent” water 
courses, such “that there is no clear demarcation between ‘waters’ and ‘wetlands.’ ” Id. at 
2226-27. In his own opinion, though, the Chief Justice argued that this state of the law 
cried out for more agency attention and especially the creation of better, clearer defini-
tions. Id. at 2235-36, (Roberts, C.J., concurring). Justice Kennedy’s opinion takes pointed 
and specific issue with Justice Scalia’s disbelief that “waters” could include arroyos. Id. at 
2242-47 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment). That is an argument Justice Kennedy 
seems to have the better of. See COOKE & REEVES, supra note 65. 
 70. Cf. Vill. of Oconomowoc Lake v. Dayton Hudson Corp., 24 F.3d 962, 965 (7th Cir. 
1994) (Easterbrook, J.) (“[T]he Clean Water Act does not attempt to assert national power 
to the fullest. ‘Waters of the United States’ must be a subset of ‘water’; otherwise why in-
sert the qualifying clause in the statute? (No one suggests that the function of this phrase 
is to distinguish domestic waters from those of Canada or Mexico.)”). 
 71. H.L.A. Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71 HARV. L. REV. 
593, 606-15 (1958). 
196  FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 34:183 
 
ality of the term is at once the source of its power and its mischief for 
any theory of law—at least any theory of law meaning to account for 
law’s normativity. Where most modern positivists would view the 
term as a source of discretion because the law is ambiguous (and 
perhaps deliberately so),72 Dworkin, Rawls, and various moral “real-
ists” view it as an implied duty to make the law more just through 
instantiations and a gradual judicial synthesis of meaning.73 Ameri-
can legal theory orbits this philosophical divide like a planet to a sun 
even though it has given off more heat than light for years now.74 
 Putting aside some nuances and intermediate positions between 
the two, the dispute comes down to the scope and legitimacy of the 
judicial role. Where positivists since H.L.A. Hart have viewed judges 
as constrained professionals doing the hard (often scut) work of ap-
plying preexisting norms to present particulars, Dworkin views the 
judiciary as the agency of justice, always working to earn law’s au-
thority on its behalf.75 Dworkin has long argued that justice requires 
that adjudicators no less than other officials find the one best interpre-
tation of the law—what the law really requires. Yet where Dworkin and 
others expect that (legal) truth might “exceed its demonstrability”76 and 
thereby require a thick, constitutive function in application, modern 
positivism responds that texts like section 502(7) have no more than a 
core of settled meaning, surrounded by a (potentially vast) “penumbra” 
of plausible interpretations.77 Thus, the dispute—what to do about legal 
                                                                                                                     
 72. See id.  
 73. See Ronald Dworkin, Judicial Discretion, 60 J. PHIL. 624 (1963); John Rawls, Two 
Concepts of Rules, 64 PHIL. REV. 3 (1955); cf. RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 245 (1986) 
[hereinafter DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE] (“Law as integrity . . . requires a judge to test his in-
terpretation of any part of the great network of political structures and decisions of his 
community by asking whether it could form part of a coherent theory justifying the net-
work as a whole.”) (emphasis added). I use “realist” to describe Dworkin, Rawls, and others 
in the epistemological sense, distinguishing them from the “antirealists” who maintain 
that meaning and truth are entirely a function of (fallible) human conventions.  
 74. Cf. BIX, supra note 60, at 182 (“The dependence of legal determinacy questions on 
matters that seem to be simply language-based but are not, is due to the nature of norma-
tive discourse. . . . [I]n the context of a moral or legal imperative, it is important to know 
the limits of a term’s application, because it is important to know whether an action is in-
cluded or excluded from a prohibition or authorization.”). This is what differentiates ordi-
nary language and its tolerable flimsiness from legal language and the necessities that it 
function according to plan.  
 75. See RONALD DWORKIN, JUSTICE IN ROBES 183-86 (2006) (arguing that legality and 
the content of law must turn not just on “social facts” or a law’s sources and pedigree but 
also on its moral content). 
 76. STEPHEN GUEST, RONALD DWORKIN 6 (1991).  
 77. HART, supra note 67, at 141-47; Jules Coleman, Incorporationism, Conventional-
ity, and the Practical Difference Thesis, in HART’S POSTSCRIPT: ESSAYS ON THE POSTSCRIPT 
TO THE CONCEPT OF LAW 98, 123-25 & n.40 (Jules Coleman ed., 2001); Brian Leiter, Legal 
Realism, Hard Positivism, and the Limits of Conceptual Analysis, in HART’S POSTSCRIPT: 
ESSAYS ON THE POSTSCRIPT TO THE CONCEPT OF LAW 355 (Jules Coleman ed., 2001). Hart 
himself always believed that the areas of “open texture” were relatively few and that, as an 
empirical matter, judicial discretion was quite interstitial. HART, supra note 67, at 154, 
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indeterminacy and its resultant discretion—can keep going right into 
the heart of law’s practical normativity.78  
 Yet, while both had a picture of meaning at the base of their the-
ory of law, neither convinced the practitioners of law or legal theory 
of their picture’s fidelity, either to how law is practiced or to what 
law should be. Hart thought he had found a third path between the 
naïve formalism of the ancients and the radical indeterminism of 
Holmes and his successors. Dworkin successfully obfuscated the path 
Hart had lit by arguing that it went nowhere, that it was a theory of 
law without its most central element: its obligations to justice. What 
the American legal academy has been left with are two theories of 
law that differ in many of the same ways semantic realism differs 
from antirealism. In their bare form, each is subject to devastating 
critique based on practitioners’ tacit knowledge of their ordinary 
practices. But once they are fully reticulated, with artful qualifica-
tions in sophisticated expositive accounts, each is quite plausible—
even elegant. 
 Of course, if both of these theories fail to authoritatively fix the 
legal meaning of a term like “waters of the United States,” a fair 
question might be: Why bother with them at all? Why care about le-
gal theory if it is so contingent and slack at exactly the junctures 
lawyers go in search of such tools? The answer is because we desper-
ately need some means of differentiating legitimate from illegitimate 
applications of the statute. We need to know whether propositions of 
law using the concept to define federal jurisdiction are true79 (or 
                                                                                                                     
274. He gave no support for this, though, and some later positivists shy from the same 
claim. See, e.g., BIX, supra note 60, at 36-62; FREDERICK SCHAUER, PLAYING BY THE RULES: 
A PHILOSOPHICAL EXAMINATION OF RULE-BASED DECISION-MAKING IN LAW AND IN LIFE 
191-96 (1991). 
 78. Positivism conceives of a norm’s (intersubjective) preexistence as integral to the 
judge’s authority to apply it, indeed, to the judiciary’s claim to authoritative decisionmak-
ing. See HART, supra note 67, at 100-17. But, to be clear, I am not implying that Hart was 
one of those who viewed discretion as a bad thing, necessarily. Hart actually maintained 
that the law’s use of general terms having an open texture could be an advantage, a way of 
enabling judges to make reasonable decisions. Id. at 125-26. Dworkin, in contrast, main-
tains that law’s normativity depends on the overall justification in its applications as much 
as its fit with past practice. DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE, supra note 73, at 285 (“A successful 
interpretation must not only fit but also justify the practice it interprets.”). And that is not 
to say Dworkin thinks fit unimportant. See DWORKIN, supra note 75, at 183 (“Legality is 
sensitive in its application . . . to the history and standing practices of the community that 
aims to respect the value, because a political community displays legality, among other re-
quirements, by keeping faith in certain ways with its past.”). 
 79. Knowing that “x is true” is the same as knowing under what conditions stating 
that “x is true” is correct. G.P. BAKER & P.M.S. HACKER, LANGUAGE, SENSE AND NONSENSE: 
A CRITICAL INVESTIGATION INTO MODERN THEORIES OF LANGUAGE 257-58 (1984). Knowl-
edge of these truth conditions might take any of several forms, though. Cf. PATTERSON, su-
pra note 62, at 18 (arguing that both people who believe reference determines meaning 
(“realists”) and people who believe usage determines meaning (“antirealists”) “believe that 
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“sound” or some such other hedge from the strong claim of truth)—
not just whether judges of one ideology or political party are likely to 
hold to the propositions.80 
 It was clear before SWANCC and Rapanos that section 502(7) and 
the CWA’s extension to “isolated” waters, ditches, and intermittent 
tributaries involved issues running much, much deeper than just a 
statutory definition.81 Indeed, if anything, SWANCC just intensified 
the federal judiciary’s vigilance toward the statute’s tensions with re-
cent federalism precedents.82 And, on first inspection, Dworkin’s the-
ory of judging gathers some confirmation from the 99+ pages of slip 
opinion in Rapanos. But that impression is misleading in a way that 
tells us something not just about the state of legal theory today, but 
also about the practice of law before one of the nation’s courts that 
has so obviously internalized Dworkin’s philosophy. For, while this 
Court has Hercules’ hubris, it has none of his discipline and evi-
dently cares little about law’s “integrity.”83 
                                                                                                                     
the truth of propositions of law is a matter of truth conditions” that are independent of the 
speaker/proposition itself).  
 80. Compare DWORKIN, supra note 75, at 94-104 (arguing that the degree to which the 
Justices in Bush v. Gore allowed their personal politics to influence their judgment should 
be regretted by all lawyers), with Cross, supra note 61, at 265 (“Among many political sci-
entists, aspects of the attitudinal model [assuming that judicial decisionmaking is not 
based upon reasoned judgment about what law requires but rather upon each judge’s po-
litical ideology and the identity of the parties] have become a virtual truism.”). 
 81. In fact, that much was evident long before SWANCC. In Avoyelles Sportsmen’s 
League, Inc. v. Marsh, 715 F.2d 897 (5th Cir. 1983), a citizen suit was brought to enjoin the 
clearing of a 20,000-acre parcel of land in Avoyelles Parish, Louisiana, lying within the 
Bayou Natchitoches basin—land that was seasonally flooded and mostly forested wetlands 
“adjacent” to navigable rivers. Id. at 901-02. EPA and the Corps were defendants because 
the plaintiffs argued the parcel was within the scope of the CWA and, thus, that the Corps 
and EPA were under a duty to assert jurisdiction. Id. While the district court took the ex-
traordinary step of making the wetlands findings itself in a trial de novo pursuant to 5 
U.S.C. § 706(2)(F), the court of appeals reversed, arguing that that was “the kind of scien-
tific decision normally accorded significant deference by the courts.” Id. at 905-06. But the 
court of appeals was troubled by the agencies’ quick change of methodology for wetlands 
determinations to include vegetation adapted to intermittent inundation and saturation as 
well as that adapted to more regular/constant inundation. Id. at 907-08 & n.18. Ultimately, 
the court held that the change was legal and not procedurally invalid under the Adminis-
trative Procedure Act, id. at 910-14, but it did so quite aware of the ramifications for the 
CWA’s geographic scope. Id. at 914-18. 
 82. See, e.g., United States v. Deaton, 332 F.3d 698, 705-08 (4th Cir. 2003). 
 83. Dworkin’s concept of integrity in law is, for him, what unites legality with justice. 
See DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE, supra note 73, at 225 (“According to law as integrity, proposi-
tions of law are true if they figure in or follow from the principles of justice, fairness, and 
procedural due process that provide the best constructive interpretation of the commu-
nity’s legal practice.”).  
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V.   RESTORING NATURE’S INTEGRITY: THE OBJECTIVE AND THE 
REAL(ITY) 
 It is, of course, impossible to restore the “chemical, physical, and 
biological integrity of the Nation’s waters”84 without reinventing 
American civilization as we know it.85 It has been said that the agen-
cies more or less accidentally ignored this mandate’s biological and 
physical prongs, but that is not quite true. Shortly after the Act’s 
passage, EPA held a national symposium on CWA section 101(a) “in-
tegrity” and what its restoration would entail.86 It was a national 
meeting of minds, but it failed to settle very much about the mis-
sion.87 All the same, the agencies issued rules defining “waters of the 
United States” in 1975, 1977, and again in 1986,88 eventually decid-
ing to broaden their definitions to include most tributaries, headwa-
ters, wetlands, and other attenuated elements of a lotic system.89 
This Part explains how two relatively conservative administrative 
agencies gradually decided, in six different Presidential administra-
tions, to expand federal jurisdiction as dramatically as they have. 
A.   Restoration as an Ecological Practice 
 Remote and isolated wetlands and tributaries, notwithstanding 
their legal attenuation from the traditional concerns of the federal 
                                                                                                                     
 84. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (2000). 
 85. See, e.g., In re Operation of the Mo. River Sys. Litig., 421 F.3d 618, 624 (8th Cir. 
2005) (“In its natural state, the river subjected the surrounding basin to extensive flooding 
every spring.”). “Chemical” integrity has dominated agency and public attention to the ex-
clusion of the other two. See generally Adler, supra note 19. And while eliminating the dis-
charge of chemical pollutants in all of the nation’s waters is work enough for many times 
the staff EPA has devoted to water programs, ADLER ET AL., supra note 31, at 227-57, 
“[t]here is considerable and more consistent evidence that the ‘physical and biological in-
tegrity’ of the nation’s waters has been steadily and seriously declining.” Adler, supra note 
19, at 50.  
 86. See James R. Karr, Biological Integrity: A Long-Neglected Aspect of Water Re-
source Management, 1 ECOLOGICAL APPLICATIONS 66, 69 (1991). 
 87. Id. 
 88. See Corps of Engineers, Notice of Interim Final Rule, 40 Fed. Reg. 31,320 (1975); 
Corps of Engineers, Notice of Final Rulemaking, 42 Fed. Reg. 37,122 (1977); Corps of En-
gineers, Notice of Final Rulemaking, 51 Fed. Reg. 41,206 (1986). 
 89. In the 1975 interim final rule (which would become the basis of the 1977 rulemak-
ing), the Corps’ basic definition swept in all waters used in the past, present, or possibly in 
the future “as a means to transport interstate commerce landward to their ordinary high 
water mark and up to the head of navigation,” including all artificial channels, canals, and 
the like, all “tributaries . . . up to their headwaters and landward to their ordinary high 
water mark,” wetlands “contiguous or adjacent to other navigable waters,” and “other wa-
ters” including “intermittent rivers, streams, tributaries, and perched wetlands that are 
not contiguous or adjacent to navigable waters” whose regulation was deemed necessary 
“for the protection of water quality.” 40 Fed. Reg. 31,320 at 31,324-325. While the Corps 
defined “headwaters” (arbitrarily) as “the point on the stream above which the flow is nor-
mally less than 5 cubic feet per second,” id. at 31325, it did seek to preserve field office dis-
cretion to include headwaters in appropriate cases. Id. No general definition of “tributary” 
was even attempted, though.  
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government, are the parts of the nation’s lotic systems perhaps most 
in need of regulatory protection today. “Isolated” wetlands, after all, 
are identified more by their legal aspects than by their physical or 
biological aspects.90 For thirty years the agencies have struggled to 
draw lines around the parts of aquatic ecosystems they should gov-
ern.91 NatureServe, a national network of natural heritage programs 
and environmental consultants that services many state and local 
governments, recently documented the roles “isolated wetlands” play. 
It confirmed their critical importance to the protection and restora-
tion of aquatic habitat, water quality, and biotic integrity.92 Indeed, 
what the agencies’ experiences document is that restoring the natu-
ral integrity of the nation’s waters is utterly impossible without 
something like the most energetic and integrative public response in 
the history of the administrative state.93 Clearest of all, though, is 
that the biota of the nation’s waters is in decline: North America’s 
most imperiled species are almost all aquatic species.94 
 While the Corps and EPA initially tried to focus only on the prin-
cipal surface waters and their immediate threats, this strategy 
quickly became untenable.95 Soon enough, the agencies learned that 
                                                                                                                     
 90. See R.W. TINER ET AL., GEOGRAPHICALLY ISOLATED WETLANDS: A PRELIMINARY 
ASSESSMENT OF THEIR CHARACTERISTICS AND STATUS IN SELECTED AREAS OF THE UNITED 
STATES 2-1 (U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 2003) (questioning the scientific validity of distin-
guishing “isolated” wetlands). As Justice Kennedy understood, establishing hydrological or 
biological connections between remote wetlands and navigable waters is easy; differentiat-
ing those with significant, proximate connections is hard. See Rapanos v. United States, 
126 S. Ct. 2208, 2248-50 (2006). The little rigorous taxonomic work that has been done on 
stream magnitude—the most intuitive method for doing so—is still more art than science. 
See Robert A. Kuehne, A Classification of Streams, Illustrated by Fish Distribution in an 
Eastern Kentucky Creek, 43 ECOLOGY 608 (1962); cf. MEYER ET AL., supra note 24, at 6 (dif-
ferentiating perennial, intermittent, and ephemeral streams). 
 91. Cf. 42 Fed. Reg. at 37,129 (“[S]treams with highly irregular flows, such as occur in 
the western portion of the country, could be dry at the ‘headwater’ point for more of the 
year and still average on a yearly basis a flow of five cubic feet per second because of high 
volume, flash flood type flows which greatly distort the average.”). By 1977, the Corps was 
making clear that its exclusion of “headwaters” from regulated tributaries was not to fence 
them out of section 502(7)’s scope necessarily, but rather to manage personnel resources 
and to say where Corps permitting authority ended as a presumption. See id. Not surpris-
ingly, the rulemaking was taken up into congressional debates as reason to clarify section 
502(7), although the 1977 amendments ultimately made no such change. See Avoyelles 
Sportsmen’s League, Inc. v. Marsh, 715 F.2d 897, 914-16 (5th Cir. 1983). This would later 
become one of the majority’s arguments supporting section 502(7)’s extension to adjacent 
wetlands in United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 135-39 (1985). 
 92. See P. COMER ET AL., BIODIVERSITY VALUES OF GEOGRAPHICALLY ISOLATED 
WETLANDS IN THE UNITED STATES (2005), available at 
http://www.natureserve.org/library/isolated_wetlands_05/isolated_wetlands.pdf.  
 93. See, e.g., Unified Federal Policy for a Watershed Approach to Federal Land and 
Resource Management, 65 Fed. Reg. 62,566 (2000); Andreen, supra note 17, at 591-93. 
 94. See ADLER ET AL., supra note 31, at 61-85; DAVID S. WILCOVE, THE CONDOR’S 
SHADOW: THE LOSS AND RECOVERY OF WILDLIFE IN AMERICA 105-37 (1999).  
 95. See ADLER ET AL., supra note 31, at 94-96, 212-14. Following Natural Resources 
Defense Council, Inc. v. Callaway, 392 F. Supp. 685 (D.D.C. 1975), the regulatory definition 
of “navigable waters of the United States” came under searching judicial scrutiny several 
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they could restore the natural integrity of a “water” only with a 
whole watershed approach, an inclusive method meant to identify 
and neutralize the variety of disturbances to aquatic ecology.96 
Though at least six Justices between SWANCC and Rapanos have 
viewed this as mission creep97—as agencies run amok—it is actually 
far more mundane: the agencies are adapting institutionally to 
achieve the CWA’s integrity objective in our legal system. Here too, 
though, questions of meaning still dominate the legal analysis, and it 
is the courts that are threatening to undo ongoing, directly delibera-
tive regulatory work by way of an empty, yet paradoxically prescrip-
tive, legal semantics.  
                                                                                                                     
times. See, e.g., United States v. DeFelice, 641 F.2d 1169 (5th Cir. 1981) (privately owned 
canal); United States v. Byrd, 609 F.2d 1204 (7th Cir. 1979) (wetlands adjacent to intra-
state lake); United States v. Earth Scis., Inc., 599 F.2d 368 (10th Cir. 1979) (intrastate 
stream never used for commercial navigation, terminating in two intrastate reservoirs); 
Leslie Salt Co. v. Froehlke, 578 F.2d 742 (9th Cir. 1978) (calculation of mean high water 
mark on salt marshes in San Francisco Bay). In only one of the cases I was able to find did a 
court reject the Corps’ interpretation of its jurisdiction. See United States v. City of Fort Pierre, 
747 F.2d 464, 466-67 (8th Cir. 1984) (holding there was no jurisdiction over a man-made slough 
with a hydrological connection to navigable waters that was caused by Corps activities).  
 96. Much has been done to publicize the shift to a watershed approach. See OFFICE OF 
WATER, ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, A REVIEW OF STATEWIDE WATERSHED MANAGEMENT 
APPROACHES (2002). Of course, its overall effectiveness and compatibility with existing fed-
eral law are still very much open questions. See James R. May, The Rise and Repose of Assimi-
lation-Based Water Quality, Part I: TMDL Litigation, 34 ENVTL. L. REP. 10247 (2004). 
 97. Chief Justices Rehnquist and Roberts and Justices O’Connor, Scalia, Thomas, and 
Alito all voted against the assertion of jurisdiction in SWANCC or Rapanos or both. Justice 
Kennedy, however, seems to have become attached to the “significant nexus” test in 
SWANCC, even where it may support broad federal jurisdiction. Of course, quite notori-
ously, the 1986 changes to the regulatory definition, done on the heels of the Riverside 
Bayview opinion, professed an intent only to “provide[] clarification” and not to broaden the 
agencies’ interpretation of section 502(7)’s geographic scope. See Final Rule for Regulatory 
Programs of the Corps of Engineers, 51 Fed. Reg. 41,206, 41,216-17 (Nov. 13, 1986). This 
same preamble discussion, though, was where the agencies first gave general notice that 
they interpreted the term to extend to waters that “would be used as habitat by birds pro-
tected by Migratory Bird Treaties” and “[w]hich are or would be used as habitat for endan-
gered species.” Id. at 41,217. And the Rapanos Guidance seems to capitalize in a similar 
way, this time stating that agency staff should heed “Justice Kennedy’s instruction” to 
“apply the significant nexus standard in a manner that restores and maintains [the chemi-
cal, physical, and biological integrity] of traditional navigable waters.”  Rapanos Guidance, 
supra note 52, at 9 n.32. 
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B.   “What Is a Tributary?”98: Judicial Hubris and the Irrelevance of 
Agency Learning 
 Once the Court found that wetlands “adjacent” to navigable wa-
ters and their tributaries are within the scope of section 502(7)99—
and then found that “isolated” waters are outside it100—the distin-
guishing features of a real “tributary” became the central issue.101 
The agencies have never defined a tributary by rule, and for good 
reason: every general definition formulated as such runs square into 
either (1) the diversity of hydrographic features in North America or 
(2) the enormity of the restorative project, biologically. A regulatory 
definition of tributary “clarifying” the scope of section 502(7), in 
short, would bring troubles both of political morality and of practica-
bility. Yet five Justices—Justices Kennedy and Scalia and those join-
ing Justice Scalia’s opinion—seemed convinced that the agencies’ re-
fusal to dive into this breach was some kind of failure on their part.102 
 Whose is the bigger failure, though? So-called engineered trans-
fers103 are shaping up to be one of the major “integrity” issues to-
                                                                                                                     
 98. Linda Greenhouse, In the Roberts Court, There’s More Room for Argument, N.Y. 
TIMES, May 3, 2006, at A1 (attributing this question to Chief Justice Roberts in the Ra-
panos and Carabell oral argument). Interestingly, the agencies now maintain that a tribu-
tary “includes natural, man-altered, or man-made water bodies that carry flow directly or 
indirectly into a traditional navigable water.” Rapanos Guidance, supra note 52, at 5 n.21. 
They even specify—in guidance only—that “a tributary . . . is the entire reach of the 
stream that is of the same order (i.e., from the point of confluence, where two lower order 
streams meet to form the tributary, downstream to the point such tributary enters a 
higher order stream).” Id. In a nod to the Chief Justice, see supra note 69, the Rapanos 
Guidance at least includes the dictum that the “agencies intend to more broadly consider 
jurisdictional issues, including clarification and definition of key terminology, through 
rulemaking or other appropriate policy process.”  Id. at 3. 
 99. United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 138-39 (1985). 
 100. Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook County v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 531 U.S. 
159, 171-72 (2001). The Court took care in 1985 to note that the provisions of the regula-
tory definition covering nonadjacent wetlands were not at issue. Riverside Bayview, 474 
U.S. at 124 n.2. The Court also took care to reference what the subject wetlands were adja-
cent to: a “navigable waterway.”  See id. at 131 n.8 (assuming adjacency is to “bodies of 
open water”). 
 101. See Rapanos v. United States, 126 S. Ct. 2208, 2217-19 (2006). Courts have put 
tributaries of navigable-in-fact waters within section 502(7)’s scope since the early 1970s, 
even prior to the agencies’ first rulemakings. See, e.g., United States v. Ashland Oil & 
Transp. Co., 504 F.2d 1317 (6th Cir. 1974); United States v. Holland, 373 F. Supp. 665 
(M.D. Fla. 1974). 
 102. Compare Rapanos, 126 S. Ct. at 2220-24 (Scalia, J., joined by Roberts, C.J., and 
Alito, Thomas, J.) (arguing that “the waters” with its “definite article” has a “natural defi-
nition” that can be taken from a 1954 dictionary that includes only “relatively permanent, 
standing or flowing bodies of water”), with id. at 2251-52 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the 
judgment) (finding that “[t]he Corps’ existing standard for tributaries,” any landform with 
a mean high water mark, provides no assurance that the CWA’s geographic scope will be 
appropriately limited). 
 103. See Brief Amici Curiae of the States of Colorado, New Mexico, Idaho, Nebraska, 
North Dakota, and Utah Urging Reversal in Support of the City of New York at 2-3 & n.1, 
Catskill Mountains Chapter of Trout Unlimited, Inc. v. City of New York (Catskills II), 451 
F.3d 77 (2d Cir. 2006) (Nos. 03-7203(L), 03-7253 (XAP) [hereinafter Western States Brief, 
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day.104 Are they “tributaries” or “point sources”? The statutory defini-
tion of “point source” includes “any discernable, confined and discrete 
conveyance” including ditches and channels105—and that means that 
some engineered transfers could conceivably be either. Lame, inde-
terminate analogies are easy here. The harder, more meaningful 
question goes directly to the statute’s highest plateau: at what does 
the integrity objective aim, exactly? Are the agencies truly obligated 
to “restore” the physical integrity of, for example, the Connecticut 
River? Including its tributaries, the Connecticut River boasts over 
one thousand dams (a few of which are centuries old) and has, for 
almost a century, gone without tributary flow that now goes to Bos-
ton’s reservoirs.106 If EPA and the Corps have no restorative obliga-
tions under the CWA growing out of that history, on what (implicit) 
grounds can that be shown? That it would be uneconomic?  
 These are not only the biggest moral questions with which a stat-
ute like the CWA confronts us, they are also its purest questions of 
statutory interpretation. They are questions our “minimalist” Su-
preme Court has, counting Rapanos and Carabell, ducked at least 
eleven times now107 and which Congress and the agencies have been 
ducking since 1972. In an important sense, there is no “natural kind” 
differentiating real tributaries from other tributaries of “navigable 
                                                                                                                     
Catskills II] (“Since most precipitation in the West falls as snow . . . it is necessary to di-
vert and deliver water through a complex system of manmade and natural conveyances 
and reservoirs. This allows the West to sustain its cities, farms, and ranches.”). 
 104. See, e.g., Miccosukee Tribe of Indians v. S. Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist., 280 F.3d 1364 
(11th Cir. 2002), rev’d in part, S. Fl. Water Mgmt. Dist. v. Miccosukee Tribe of Indians, 541 
U.S. 95 (2004); Catskill Mountains Chapter of Trout Unlimited, Inc. v. City of New York 
(Catskills I), 273 F.3d 481 (2d Cir. 2001), aff’d in part, remanded in part, Catskills II, 244 
F. Supp. 2d 41 (N.D.N.Y. 2003); Dubois v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 102 F.3d 1273 (1st Cir. 
1996). 
 105. 33 U.S.C. § 1362(14) (2000).  
 106. See Connecticut v. Massachusetts, 282 U.S. 660 (1931); cf. Western States Brief, 
Catskills II, supra note 103, at 6 (“[T]he ability to divert, transport, store, and use water is 
critical to the social and economic well-being of the West. Moving water from one basin to 
another through engineered transfers is essential to meet municipal, industrial, and agri-
cultural demands.”). 
 107. “Minimalism,” a philosophy of deciding things on the narrowest and shallowest 
grounds possible, is usually packaged as a model of judicial restraint (not one of incoher-
ence). See, e.g., CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON THE 
SUPREME COURT (1999). The Supreme Court’s avoidance of the CWA’s “integrity” ideal 
strains that packaging at the very least. See, e.g., S.D. Warren Co. v. Maine Dep’t of Evntl. 
Prot., 126 S. Ct. 1843, 1852-53 (2006); Miccosukee Tribe, 541 U.S. at 102-12; Solid Waste 
Agency of N. Cook County v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 531 U.S. 159, 175-97 (2001) (Ste-
vens, J., dissenting); Cargill, Inc. v. United States, 516 U.S. 955 (1995) (Thomas, J., dis-
senting from the denial of cert.); PUD No. 1 v. Wash. Dep’t of Ecology, 511 U.S. 700, 707-22 
(1994); Arkansas v. Oklahoma, 503 U.S. 91, 102-14 (1992); Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 
456 U.S. 305, 311-20 (1982); Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. Nat’l Sea Clammers 
Ass’n, 453 U.S. 1, 32-33 (1981) (Stevens, J., joined by Blackmun, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part); Costle v. Pac. Legal Found., 445 U.S. 198, 200-04 (1980). 
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waters.”108 Too many of our aquatic ecosystems have become what 
they are today because of profound derangements of their water-
shed.109 And many tributaries are ecologically integral without being 
permanent, significant, or particularly natural.110 Thus, unsurpris-
ingly, the agencies have waffled on general propositions.111  
 In 1975, EPA’s General Counsel found that, on the best interpre-
tation of the statute and its legislative history, massive irrigation 
projects and engineered transfers could, under the right circum-
stances, be point sources.112 Thirty years later, in taking a “holistic 
approach” to the statute, EPA quite incredibly concluded the exact 
opposite.113 According to EPA now, engineered transfers are never 
                                                                                                                     
 108. Even in a realist semantics where there is supposed to be “a causal-historical path 
of the appropriate sort connecting our use of the term, via various intermediaries, with the 
[thing] itself,” Brink, supra note 62, at 117, science has thus far failed to reveal that path 
for lotic systems as wholes, leaving essentially no truth conditions for any claim of a con-
troversial sort here. Cf. COOKE & REEVES, supra note 65, at 187-89 (concluding the evi-
dence supports a causal correlation between human land use changes and arroyo forma-
tion, but leaving to the “area of speculation” which land use changes are responsible). In a 
pragmatic sense, of course, there are manageably coherent concepts of “natural” as distinct 
from “artificial” waters. The reflecting pool on the Capitol Mall is intuitively different from 
the Tidal Basin beside the Jefferson Memorial even if both are “artificial” in some sense. 
But to assume this intuition can be formulated into a general principle distinguishing 
which human-influenced waters are still ecologically integral and/or significant is to as-
sume away too many of ecology’s realities today. 
 109. WILCOVE, supra note 94, at 116-20. This fact alone has sobered the agencies in 
their pursuit of the integrity mandate. See Mank, supra note 8, at 886-89; cf. Memorandum 
from Ann R. Klee, Gen. Counsel, U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, to Regional Administrators, 
U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, Agency Interpretation on Applicability of Section 402 of the 
Clean Water Act to Water Transfers, 3-4 (Aug. 5, 2005) [hereinafter Klee Memorandum] 
(“Many large cities in the west and the east would not have adequate sources of water for 
their citizens were it not for the continuous redirection of water from outside basins.”). 
 110. See MEYER ET AL., supra note 24, at 16-21; COOKE & REEVES, supra note 65, at 5-
15. There is, however, good reason to believe that the ordinary concept of a “tributary” 
masks a great deal of natural variability that, if better described and understood, might 
dissolve at least some of the issues now surrounding section 502(7). See id. at 6-7. 
 111. See, e.g., Klee Memorandum, supra note 109, at 2-3 & n.5 (acknowledging agency 
inconsistency).  
 112. See In re Riverside Irrigation Dist., Ltd. and 17 Others, Decision of the General 
Counsel No. 21 (June 27, 1975) [hereinafter Riverside Opinion]. Point sources are prohib-
ited from discharging without a permit. 33 U.S.C. § 1311 (2000). Shortly after the River-
side Opinion, a district court held that EPA lacked authority to exempt such discharges 
from the regulatory definition of point source. See Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. Train, 
396 F. Supp. 1393 (D.D.C. 1975). Shortly after that the 1977 amendments changed section 
502 to exclude “agricultural stormwater discharges and return flows from irrigated agri-
culture.” 33 U.S.C. § 1362(14). Questions often arise, though, over the scope and meaning 
of that exclusion. See, e.g., Concerned Area Residents for the Env’t v. Southview Farm, 34 
F.3d 114 (2d Cir. 1994). 
 113. See Klee Memorandum, supra note 109, at 5. Oddly, in its “holistic approach” the 
Klee Memorandum misstates that “[t]he purpose of the CWA is to protect water quality.” 
Id. The memo was directed at regional personnel, ordering them to resist several circuit 
court precedents holding that engineered transfers could be point sources. Id. at 2-3. The 
agency eventually began an informal rulemaking process to formalize its interpretation of “point 
source.” See National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) Water Transfers Pro-
posed Rule, 71 Fed. Reg. 32,887 (June 7, 2006) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 122). 
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point sources and ought not be regulated by the CWA at all.114 Yet, 
given the statute’s integrity objective, this just sets up the dilemma 
of whether some actual canal, ditch, slough, channel, or the like con-
veying water is, instead, a tributary within the meaning of section 
502(7) and its regulations.115  
 Before Rapanos and SWANCC, courts usually—in deference to 
the agencies—did not distinguish between natural and artificial wa-
ters, wetlands, and tributaries.116 Of course, neither agency has ever 
explained or given general reasons for its approach. The agencies had 
found, it seems, that generalizations about tributaries were prema-
ture.117 And forbearance of this kind is well known in administrative 
                                                                                                                     
 114. See Klee Memorandum, supra note 109, at 5 (“The [CWA] expresses the under-
standing that, as a general matter, water control facilities that merely transport ‘the wa-
ters of the United States’ to where they can be most beneficially used are not subject to the 
NPDES regime.”); cf. Proposed Rule, 71 Fed. Reg. 32,887, 32,890 (“Water transfers are an 
essential component of the nation’s infrastructure for delivering water that users are enti-
tled to receive under State law.”). 
 115. But cf. Rapanos v. United States, 126 S. Ct. 2208, 2223 n.7 (2006) (Scalia, J., 
joined by Roberts, C.J., and Thomas, Alito, J.) (“It is also true that highly artificial, manu-
factured, enclosed conveyance systems . . . likely do not qualify as ‘waters of the United 
States,’ despite the fact that they may contain continuous flows of water.”). If that is true, 
it is unclear how. See, e.g., P.F.Z. Props., Inc. v. Train, 393 F. Supp. 1370 (D.D.C. 1975) 
(wetlands adjacent to canals not used in navigation for many years held to be within the 
scope of section 502(7)). Neither EPA nor the Corps has ever taken the position that the in-
clusion of “tributaries” within 40 C.F.R. § 122.2 and 33 C.F.R. § 328.3 implicitly or other-
wise excluded artificial tributaries such as canals, ditches, swales, and so on. See United 
States v. Tull, 769 F.2d 182, 184-85 (4th Cir. 1985), rev’d on other grounds, Tull v. United 
States, 481 U.S. 412 (1987) (dredge and fill case involving wetlands adjacent to man-made 
drainage ditch that had been, at one time, subject to the ebb and flow of the tide). 
 116. Compare In re Boyer, 109 U.S. 629, 632 (1884) (federal navigation power extends 
to man-made canals), with Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 169 n.3 (1979) 
(privately owned artificial inlet hydrologically connected to Pacific Ocean is itself navigable 
waters within the meaning of the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899). Wetlands cases involv-
ing artificial influences and/or connections include Tull, 769 F.2d at 184-85; United States 
v. DeFelice, 641 F.2d 1169 (5th Cir. 1981); United States v. Stoeco Homes, Inc., 498 F.2d 
597 (3d Cir. 1974). One decison, United States v. City of Fort Pierre, 747 F.2d 464, 467 (8th 
Cir. 1984), without explaining why, held that wetlands conditions created by the Corps’ 
own navigation projects in an adjacent river could not support the extension of federal ju-
risdiction. Two Seventh Circuit cases also observed that there were limits to the geo-
graphic scope of section 502(7). See Vill. of Oconomowoc Lake v. Dayton Hudson Corp., 24 
F.3d 962 (7th Cir. 1994); Hoffman Homes, Inc. v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 999 F.2d 256 
(7th Cir. 1993).  
 117. The agencies have maintained that anything with an “ordinary high water mark” 
may be a tributary. Cf. 33 C.F.R. § 328.4(c) (2006) (“In the absence of adjacent wetlands, 
the jurisdiction extends to the ordinary high water mark . . . .”); 51 Fed. Reg. 41,206, 
41,217 (“[I]n the absence of wetlands the upstream limit of Corps jurisdiction also stops 
when the ordinary high water mark is no longer perceptible.”). Yet, given the lack of an in-
terval in their definition of an ordinary high water mark, see 33 C.F.R. at § 328.3(e) (2006), 
this is less of a general definition than a delegation of discretion to the field officer—
exactly what a rational agency should do if it lacks a preference on a general definition. Cf. 
SCHAUER, supra note 77, at 43 (“To the extent that generalizations become entrenched, the 
inclusions of past generalizations facilitate dealing with the future when it is like the past, 
but the suppressions of past generalizations impede dealing with the future when that fu-
ture departs from our prior expectations.”). 
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law. In fact, it has long been an adjunct of judicial respect for agency 
expertise:  
Not every principle essential to the effective administration of a 
statute can or should be cast immediately into the mold of a gen-
eral rule. Some principles must await their own development, 
while others must be adjusted to meet particular, unforeseeable 
situations. In performing its important functions in these respects, 
therefore, an administrative agency must be equipped to act either 
by general rule or by individual order. To insist upon one form of ac-
tion to the exclusion of the other is to exalt form over necessity.118 
Yet at least four Justices—two of whom had yet to serve even a 
full Term—thought that hubris explained the wetlands programs 
better than a deft touch taken to an especially hard problem of resto-
ration ecology. Nonetheless, confronting the tradeoffs raised by the 
integrity ideal on a case-by-case basis cannot be the Executive run 
amok, insulting the dignity of states. If anything, EPA and the Corps 
have avoided the very kind of narcissistic self-certainty of which the 
Rapanos plurality had too much.119 For better or worse, the agencies 
have sought to preserve the geographic scope of section 502(7)—often 
just leaving a vacuum where they had implied they would serve as a 
regulatory check120—for the simple reason that, in our legal culture, 
it seems the only possible path to the statute’s ends: the restoration 
of the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the nation’s wa-
ters. Still, Part VI suggests that this has been their biggest mistake. 
VI.   INTERPRETING ADMINISTRATIVE AUTHORITY: LAW’S INTEGRITY 
AND NATURE’S 
 Given its ubiquity and ambiguity in regulatory practice today, 
Chevron was surely the “known unknown” in the Rapanos litiga-
                                                                                                                     
 118. SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 202 (1947). 
 119. Notwithstanding Justice Scalia’s confidence in his dictionary (at least one edition 
of his dictionary, see MCI Telecomms. Corp. v. AT&T Co., 512 U.S. 218, 225-28 & n.3 
(1994)), H.L. Mencken was probably right when he said that for every complex problem 
there is a solution that is simple, neat, and wrong. Whatever the possibilities for a seman-
tics of “waters” or, derivatively, of “tributary,” 
one of the most frequent justifications courts give for choosing a particular con-
struction is that the alternative interpretation would produce “absurd” results, 
or results less compatible with the reason or purpose of the statute. This, it 
seems to me, unquestionably involves judicial consideration and evaluation of 
competing policies, and for precisely the same purpose for which . . . agencies 
consider and evaluate them—to determine which one will best effectuate the 
statutory purposes. 
Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretations of Law, 1989 DUKE 
L.J. 511, 515.  
 120. See Adler, supra note 27, at 66-70; see also William E. Taylor & Kate L. Geoffroy, 
General and Nationwide Permits, in WETLANDS LAW AND POLICY: UNDERSTANDING 
SECTION 404, 151 (Kim Diana Connolly et al. eds., 2005). 
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tion.121 Chevron’s tenure at the Supreme Court has been tumultuous, 
a function of its own internally conflicted justification.122 Today, de-
spite its importance, it is a mangled wreckage of barely reconcilable 
precedents,123 at least in part because the Chevron opinion could not 
possibly have meant what it seemed to say.124 In Dworkin’s terms, it 
seemed to picture the judicial role as one where courts ensure that 
an agency’s statutory interpretation “fits” but not necessarily that it 
be justified.125 And that seemed like a rather denatured role for 
courts in our system. Empirical analysis to date largely confirms that 
the lower courts have afforded greater deference to agency interpre-
tations more often when they apply Chevron.126 Given our judicial hi-
                                                                                                                     
 121. See supra note 12 and accompanying text. In Rapanos, both the dissents and Jus-
tice Kennedy pointedly mention Chevron’s role in Riverside Bayview. See Rapanos v. 
United States, 126 S. Ct. 2208, 2240 (2006) (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment); id. 
at 2252-53, 2259 n.8 (Stevens, J., dissenting); id. at 2266 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Interest-
ingly, though, Justice Kennedy does not rely on Chevron in his own opinion in Rapanos in 
any way. 
 122. Chevron articulates at least three distinct reasons for the judiciary to defer to ad-
ministrative agencies’ interpretations of statutes, including congressional intent, the rela-
tive expertise of agencies compared to courts, and the relative political accountability of 
agencies compared to courts. See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 
467 U.S. 837, 842-65 (1984). The last of these, political accountability, broke from prior 
precedent and is, in many ways, inconsistent with the other two. See Thomas A. Merrill, 
The Story of Chevron: The Making of an Accidental Landmark, in ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 
STORIES 399, 413-14 (Peter L. Strauss ed., 2006) (describing Paul Bator’s role as the first 
“political” Solicitor General and his argument in Chevron that the reason courts ought to 
defer to agency interpretations of law is because the President supervises agencies and 
they are, therefore, politically accountable). 
 123. See, e.g., Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 
967, 125 S. Ct. 2688 (2005); Clackamas Gastroenterology Assocs. v. Wells, 538 U.S. 440 
(2003); Barnhart v. Walton, 535 U.S. 212 (2002); Edelman v. Lynchburg Coll., 535 U.S. 
106, 114 (2002); United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218 (2001); Christensen v. Harris 
County, 529 U.S. 576 (2000); Reno v. Bossier Parish Sch. Bd., 528 U.S. 320 (2000); FDA v. 
Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120 (2000); AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 
525 U.S. 366 (1999); Nat’l Fed’n of Fed. Employees, Local 1309 v. Dep’t of the Interior, 526 
U.S. 86 (1999); K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 486 U.S. 281 (1988); NLRB v. United Food & 
Commercial Workers Union, Local 23, AFL-CIO, 484 U.S. 112 (1987); INS v. Cardoza-
Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 446-48 (1987). 
 124. Cf. Thomas W. Merrill, Judicial Deference to Executive Precedent, 101 YALE L.J. 
969, 969-70 (1992) (“[R]ead for all it is worth, [Chevron] would make administrative actors 
the primary interpreters of federal statutes and relegate courts to the largely inert role of 
enforcing unambiguous statutory terms.”); see Orin S. Kerr, Shedding Light on Chevron: 
An Empirical Study of the Chevron Doctrine in the U.S. Courts of Appeals, 15 YALE J. ON 
REG. 1, 44-47 (1998) (noting how drastically Chevron seems to truncate the judiciary’s tra-
ditional role in reviewing agency interpretations of law).  
 125. Compare DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE, supra note 73, at 285 (“A successful interpre-
tation must not only fit but also justify the practice it interprets.”), with Chevron, 467 U.S. 
at 842-43 (“If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter; for the court, as 
well as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress. . . . 
[However], if the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the ques-
tion for the court is whether the agency’s answer is based on a permissible construction of 
the statute.”). 
 126. See Aaron P. Avila, Application of the Chevron Doctrine in the D.C. Circuit, 8 
N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 398, 429 (2000); Kerr, supra note 124; Peter H. Schuck & E. Donald 
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erarchy, it is probably unremarkable that lower courts “seem to take 
Chevron more seriously than does the Supreme Court.”127 But Ra-
panos well demonstrates how the Supreme Court itself applies Chev-
ron in deep statutory conflicts like the ones provoked by section 
502(7): capriciously.128 In fact, it is shocking how little force the case 
seems to exert on the one bench so obviously positioned to make big 
mistakes often. 
 In the famous Hart/Dworkin debate about how often law’s “open 
texture” confers a kind of generative discretion on interpreters,129 
Chevron’s most recent appearances at the Court are chilling. The 
empirical evidence may not explicitly confirm the attitudinal hy-
pothesis,130 but neither does it refute one. Indeed, Hart’s faith in an 
interstitial picture of discretion bounded by precedent lacks credibil-
ity if the Chevron doctrine is the focus. Yet if there is some true 
meaning to Chevron, some best way it hangs together with the rest of 
administrative law the Justices are trying to find, it is so far lost on 
the rest of us. At the very least the Justices have shown that the au-
thority of administrative agencies is, for them, an “interpretive con-
cept.”131 And that should be reason enough to demand more from the 
Court than Rapanos yielded, both as to Chevron and as to its inter-
pretation of the CWA. For all their supposed hubris, the agencies had 
gone out of their way to respect state sovereignty and to balance sec-
tions 101(a) and 101(b) of the CWA—as any practitioner of water law 
knows. Indeed, if there is a move in this story demanding better jus-
tification from the agencies, it is EPA’s “reinterpretation” of engi-
neered transfers now underway.132 How it squares with the CWA’s 
                                                                                                                     
Elliott, To the Chevron Station: An Empirical Study of Federal Administrative Law, 1990 
DUKE L.J. 984, 1058-59. Merrill argued to the contrary. See Merrill, supra note 124, at 980-
85. 
 127. RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR. ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PROCESS 387 (4th ed. 
2004) 
 128. See, e.g., Note, “How Clear Is Clear” in Chevron’s Step One?, 118 HARV. L. REV. 
1687 (2005) (it depends). 
 129. See supra notes 75-80 and accompanying text. 
 130. The attitudinal hypothesis is that Supreme Court Justices seek to effectuate their 
own favored policy outcomes by requiring deference when agencies are ideologically similar 
to themselves and by discouraging it when agencies are not. See Linda R. Cohen & Mat-
thew L. Spitzer, Judicial Deference to Agency Action: A Rational Choice Theory and an 
Empirical Test, 69 S. CAL. L. REV. 431 (1996). Recent data neither confirm nor refute the 
hypothesis. See Matthew C. Stephenson, Mixed Signals: Reconsidering the Political Econ-
omy of Judicial Deference to Administrative Agencies, 56 ADMIN. L. REV. 657 (2004). All 
jurisprudents, Hart and Dworkin included, reject such hypotheses, if on different grounds.  
 131. Compare Thomas W. Merrill & Kathryn Tongue Watts, Agency Rules with the 
Force of Law: The Original Convention, 116 HARV. L. REV. 467 (2002) (detailing the mean-
dering evolution of Supreme Court doctrine on agency lawmaking authority), with 
DWORKIN, supra note 75, at 12 (“A useful theory of an interpretive concept must itself be 
an interpretation, which is very likely to be controversial, of the practice in which the con-
cept figures.”).  
 132. See supra notes 109-14 and accompanying text. 
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integrity objective is a mystery. Like the guidance EPA and the 
Corps released to instruct their staffs in implementing Rapanos, it 
seems best characterized as bureaucratic senescence.133 
 Recall that the most significant distinction of Dworkin’s jurispru-
dence from the more conventional accounts of positivism is his meta-
physical realism, what is called his “right answer” thesis.134 Judges 
subscribing to this philosophy view their own authority quite expan-
sively. For all its confidence in Rapanos, though, the plurality did 
nothing to advance Dworkin’s thesis. It did not at all justify its fear 
for the dignity of states within statutes like the CWA. The obsession 
with section 502(7)’s geography cannot really be about the intelligi-
bility of denoting lands as “waters.”135 Statutes do worse to the lan-
guage all the time. But, of course, when it comes to states’ dignity, 
this Supreme Court has a history of raising Damocles swords, immi-
nent storm clouds of constitutional trouble unnamed and formless, 
that it says are threatening but which it will avoid by its interpretive 
genius.136 Genius has its limits: no rationale for the result in Rapanos 
seemed shallow or narrow enough for five votes. And in its “mod-
esty,” the plurality shirked its responsibility to justify a finding of, or 
even to explain what precisely had been, the agencies’ abuse of their 
authority. Given section 101(a)’s text and what the agencies have 
learned about aquatic ecosystems, this seems like a terrible oversight 
on the plurality’s part. Whatever it is, it is not modesty. It is much 
closer to caprice and the disregard of the obligation to render a 
transparent judgment.137 
 Ecologists insist that two things still tightly coupled in the legal 
imagination must be decoupled before we can pursue seriously the 
restoration of nature’s integrity: geography and sovereignty. That is, 
                                                                                                                     
 133.  See Rapanos Guidance, supra note 52. Putting all engineered transfers beyond the 
scope of the CWA makes their rehabilitation even more problematic, much as adopting 
Justice Kennedy’s “significant nexus” test for headwaters and wetlands drives up the mar-
ginal costs of CWA section 404 regulation—a program that is already desperately under-
funded. But cf. id. at 10-12. 
 134. See supra notes 75-77 and accompanying text.  
 135. The concept of navigable waters has long extended upland to a mean high wa-
ter/tide line. See, e.g., Borax Consol. v. City of Los Angeles, 296 U.S. 10, 15-27 (1935). De-
pending on its calculation, this can mean a lot of “fast” land—including the most valuable 
shore land. See, e.g., Leslie Salt Co. v. Froehlke, 578 F.2d 742, 753 (9th Cir. 1978) (holding 
that “in tidal areas, ‘navigable waters of the United States,’ as used in the Rivers and Har-
bors Act, extend to all places covered by the ebb and flow of the tide to the mean high wa-
ter (MHW) mark in its unobstructed, natural state”); see also Submerged Lands Act, ch. 
65, 67 Stat. 29 (1953) (codified as amended at 43 U.S.C. §§ 1301-15 (2000)). But cf. Ra-
panos v. United States, 126 S. Ct. 2208, 2222 (2006) (“The plain language of the statute 
simply does not authorize [the] ‘Land is Waters’ approach to federal jurisdiction.”). 
 136. See, e.g., Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 456-70 (1991).  
 137. See DWORKIN, supra note 75, at 73 (“We are modest, not when we turn our back 
on difficult theoretical issues about our roles and responsibilities as people, citizens, and 
officials, but when we confront those issues with an energy and courage forged in a vivid 
sense of our fallibility.”). 
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a truly expert approach to the CWA’s integrity mandate—and, thus, 
to the concept of “waters of the United States”—would little resemble 
what even the Rapanos dissent envisioned. For, by now, it would 
have abandoned the strictly geographic interpretation of “waters of 
the United States” and, by extension, sovereignty. With its deference 
to resource-starved federal agencies that have pinioned themselves 
into trying to govern massive territories comprising America’s major 
watersheds,138 even Justice Stevens’ opinion dulled the sharpest 
point of the integrity objective. Interpreting “waters of the United 
States” to reach beyond geography and toward newer, cooperative 
models of the jurisdiction to prescribe would necessarily acknowledge 
the complexity and moral diversity that have engulfed the CWA’s re-
storative agenda and highlight the need for institutions better fit for 
their challenges.139 
 Where nature is concerned, traditional conceptions of sovereignty 
have been embarrassed by geographic boundaries time and again. 
Too many lawyers remain blind to this basic truth, though, and that 
mushrooming failure (of both theory and practice) was showcased in 
Rapanos and Carabell. Unless they just have some unstated agenda 
at odds with congressional objectives like CWA section 101(a), 
though, the Justices need a better institutional imagination at 
least.140 As matters stand, the Roberts Court seems poised to keep 
compromising our law’s integrity as society experiments with ways to 
restore and protect nature’s. 
 
                                                                                                                     
 138. Cf. Rapanos, 126 S. Ct. at 2259 (Stevens, J., joined by Souter, Ginsburg, and 
Breyer, JJ., dissenting) (“In final analysis . . . [w]hether the benefits of particular conserva-
tion measures outweigh their costs is a classic question of public policy that should not be 
answered by appointed judges.”). The first case the dissent cites is Chevron, id. at 2252-53, 
and deference is the key theme of the opinion.  
 139. Cf. Michael C. Dorf, Legal Indeterminacy and Institutional Design, 78 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 875, 932 (2003) (“What [most twentieth-century legal theory] did not contemplate was 
the possibility of new sorts of public institutions whose job it would be, not to resolve legal 
ambiguity, but to foster continual deliberation and experimentation.”). 
 140. It would, in other words, recast the concept “waters of the United States” as a 
catalyst for experimentation in the pursuit of the integrity ideal—not as a circular ques-
tion of meaning dividing faction from faction. See id. at 972 (“To cooperate, of course, is not 
necessarily to agree, and it is precisely for that reason that experimentalism—by imagin-
ing law as a pathway to cooperative problem solving rather than as a tool for adjudicating 
conflicting claims—promises a path around the problem of moral diversity.”). 
